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Abstract— The process of monitoring vehicles used in road
transports plays an important role in detecting fraud commit-
ted by drivers. Algorithm designers face a number of chal-
lenges, including large number of vehicles monitored, de-
mands related to online calculations, and ability to easily ex-
plain fraud alarms triggered to supervisors who make final
decisions about actions to be taken. In this paper, we propose
rather general, lightweight stream, online heuristics. The vehi-
cle’s position is periodically controlled by a GNSS device. The
algorithm detects potential illegal activities along the route be-
tween the origin and the destination. Anomalies in the vehicle’s
trajectory are detected, based on a multi-resolution analysis
of the economy of routes. The economy metric is easily under-
stood and verifiable by controllers. The solution is also capable
of identifying clearly suspicious trajectories that popular ge-
ofencing approaches would overlook. The scale on which the
solution may be adopted is obtained thanks to the stream –
like nature of the algorithm: essentially, the resources used
do not increase along with the size of the input stream (the
number of GNSS frames generated for the vehicle). An ex-
periment illustrating the algorithm’s viability is presented
as well.
Keywords—fraud detection, stream processing, transport moni-
toring.
1. Introduction and Related Work
The process of monitoring road transport operations [1]
is usually understood as using a global navigation satellite
system (GNSS) – in more cases GPS – to control the po-
sition of vehicles. A vehicle is equipped with an on-board
unit (OBU) which identifies its GPS position and sends
it, periodically, over the Internet, to a host computer sys-
tem. An operator checks the position of the vehicle in or-
der to control compliance with predefined routes and time
schedules, to ensure the safety of the truck and its crew,
and to identify any irregularities, such as extra pickups
or drops.
Let us focus on the last activity, i.e. detection of fraud. Usu-
ally, commercial vehicles travel between predefined origin
and destination locations, transporting goods between these
points. A similar situation is dealt with in the case of taxi
operations, where the passenger needs to be transported
from a particular starting point to a specific destination. In
all such situations, there is a risk that the driver may commit
fraud by transporting some additional goods or passengers,
on their own initiative, along with the legal load. This may
require the driver to visit additional locations along his/her
route, to illegally drop or pickup additional goods. Drivers
may also take care of their private business while working.
The methods used to detect such cases of frauds are based
on various concepts.
Such methods may be online- or offline-based. In an online
analysis, a suspicious behavior of the vehicle is detected by
the system quickly after or even before the forbidden be-
havior takes place. For example, the system detects that
a truck is driving in the wrong direction, or that it takes
a lengthy break between the loading/dropping locations.
An efficient online detection system may be used for trig-
gering an alarm informing monitoring center staff about
such events. They, in turn, may contact the driver or send
other employees to check on the suspicious vehicle. An of-
fline analysis consists in analyzing journeys after these have
been completed (one-by-one or as a set), in order to detect
potential fraud.
The detection methods may be used on different scales.
The number of vehicles monitored may grow rapidly in
large companies. Monitoring systems may also be operated
by governments, countrywide, and may cover considerable
number of vehicles. For example, road transports of se-
lected goods have been monitored in Poland since 2017,
pursuant to the “Act on the goods transport monitoring sys-
tem” dated 9 March 2017. The main goal of the solution is
to control the movement of goods subject to the imposition
of excise duty predominantly fuels. The key objective is to
prevent unauthorized or unofficial loading or unloading op-
erations that would result in avoiding the payment of taxes.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Act, any operations involv-
ing transportation of specific goods must be preceded by
a suitable notification submitted via a government-operated
online system, known as SENT [2]. The notification con-
tains: a CN (or the Polish PKU) classification code of
the goods concerned, their quantity, address of loading
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and unloading locations, details of contractors involved,
date on which the transport operation begins, vehicle de-
tails (mainly the license plate number) and owner’s details.
As of the end of 2018, vehicles transporting goods moni-
tored with the use of the SENT system must also be moni-
tored by GNSS. Therefore, a vehicle must be equipped with
a mobile phone with a suitable tracking app. Alternatively,
an on-board unit (OBU) already installed in the vehicle
may be used in connection with the host system to collect
information required by the government. A single frame of
tracking information contains primarily GNSS coordinates
of the truck, GNNS time corresponding to the specific po-
sition, and identification data (of the OBU). There are two
sources of information: SENT declarations and tracking
information. Several authorities are allowed to control the
vehicles in order to verify, whether the actual status of the
vehicle matches the declarations submitted.
From the point of view of efficiency of the monitoring
process, it is important how the vehicle’s position is ana-
lyzed within the company. It seems that manual (visual)
supervision seems to be the most common approach. The
position of a vehicle is displayed on a map, along with
its speed and trajectory. This information is analyzed by
the operator. Interestingly, according to practitioners, may
systems of this type are based on manual analysis. OBUs
obtain GPS information periodically (in predefined inter-
vals, upon a predefine distance has been covered, or of the
speed has changed by a specific value). It needs to be borne
in mind, however, that it is not always possible to send GPS
data (to the host) online. The Internet connection may be
temporarily unavailable due to switching between differ-
ent base stations, the vehicle may be present in coverage
holes, or the OBU may be switched off. Therefore, OBUs
usually buffer GPS frames and retransmit them after the
Internet connection has been regained. Interestingly, it is
often the case that the current position is transmitted first,
followed by the delayed frames. The current position of the
vehicle is more important for the operator than its histori-
cal location. Therefore, OBUs do not preserve the order of
GPS frames while sending. This indicates (though, clearly,
does not determine with certainty) that the analysis per-
formed is either manual or, even if automatic, is based on
some simple logic that does not require the true order of
GNSS frames. A clear drawback of the manual approach
consists in its dependence on the mental and physical con-
dition of humans performing the analysis, who are capa-
ble of supervising a small number of vehicles only. In
order cope with this, new systems are usually equipped
with automated solutions that are based on some simple
logic. The logic uses additional information from vehicle
sensors (see [3]). Load sensing capabilities are particu-
larly useful, since they allow to easily detect anomalies in
the weight of the commodity, caused by illegal drops or
pickups made during the trip. Fraud evidence provided by
such sensors is of the solid variety, since it is difficult to
explain unplanned changes in load weight. On the other
hand, equipping vehicles with specialized sensors is not al-
ways possible due to cost, compatibility and scale-related
considerations.
Geofencing [4]–[6] is a good example of the automatic
analysis-based approach. The area in which the vehicle
may be present is defined, and each violation of the bor-
derline triggers on alarm that calls for specific action to be
taken. The permitted region is often defined as a corri-
dor along a predefined route. The logic of geofencing is
simple and an alarm may be generated based on analyz-
ing a single frame, independently of the previous frames.
The geofencing algorithm does not require a lot of mem-
ory. As explained in subsequent sections, one the main
difficulties associated with geofencing consists in the need
to deal with a potentially large number of routes between
two points within the road network. This problem is faced
unless we force the vehicle to use a particular route (which
is not always viable, e.g. when transport monitoring sys-
tems are operated by governments). Some route variants
can be complicated and winding, which makes them clearly
uneconomical and fraud-suspicious, but still permitted by
geofencing. Moreover, drivers may be required to make
small detours to rest areas, service stations or by accident,
when they get lost along the way or make a mistake at an
intersection. Geofencing might be too sensitive for such
scenarios.
Not surprisingly, various machine learning techniques have
been deployed to detect anomalies and fraud in trans-
port. Various methods are used here, including statisti-
cal approach [7], statistical methods combined with the
Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [8], separation through
support vector machines [9], just to name a few works.
Such approaches usually compare the current route to what
they have learned about former routes during the learning
phase. The approaches are perfectly capable of modeling
proper routes inherited from the mathematical method re-
lied upon a while learning. However, they also suffer from
several drawbacks. The first one is shared with geofenc-
ing: there are the plenty of possible routes between any
two points, which are equally reasonable and are character-
ized by similar lengths and, therefore, costs. Nonetheless, if
we compare such routes using a simple similarity measure,
e.g. based on distances between trajectory points, routes
that are almost equal become dissimilar. This phenomenon
complicates the learning process and hinders the process of
identifying a good model. The second problem consists in
the verdict given by the algorithm (e.g. detection of a suspi-
cious route) being difficult to explain to a supervisor. This
is a known drawback of many learning methods, but it plays
an important role in our application. Usually, the algorithm
triggers a suspicious route alarm that is later taken over by
an operator whose role is to either initiate verification, com-
merce a pursuit or cancel the alarm. In order to make the
decision, it is desirable that the operator knows why the sys-
tem has triggered the alarm. Another drawback of learning
methods consists in the fact that the learning phase has to
take place, which means that the system cannot start oper-
ating without having collected a reliable history of routes,
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possibly manually marked by an operator as valid or fraud
prone. Such approaches may also be of the heavy-weight
nature, both in terms of their conceptual complexity and
computing resources required, especially during the learn-
ing phase. Selected authors are aware of these drawbacks
and apply various measures to prevent them. For example,
in [7], a one-class learning approach is used which simpli-
fies the learning phase by making it human-independent.
Addition of the two-class learning approach, when a hu-
man introduces negative (suspicious) examples, is possible
as well. This optimizes the learning effect and also allows
the learned model to follow human way of reasoning. The
authors of [8] observe the phenomenon of multiplicity of
equivalent routes. Thus they assess the current route not
only by a usual point-distance similarity measure in ref-
erence to typical routes, but also by examining the total
length of the connection. The expected distribution of the
length for a given starting and ending point is calculated
based on the historical files. Sadly, the authors only con-
sider the total length of the vehicle’s trajectory. They do not
deal with the sections of fragments of the trajectory, poten-
tially omitting some local deviations from the proper route.
An interesting approach to online work and to the large
scale of computing is proposed in [10]. As usual, a dis-
similarity measure is used to compare the current trajec-
tory with the historical ones. The potentially resource-
heavy method is accelerated with special indexing of tra-
jectories performed via the so-called local clustering and
vantage trees.
In this paper, a fraud detection method based on on-line
knowledge concerning development of the vehicle’s trajec-
tory is proposed. When the system detects an anomaly in
the trajectory fragment observed so far, it triggers an alarm
that draws the attention of the supervisor and requires them
to take suitable action or to disregard the alarm. The pro-
posed approach is based on a multi-resolution analysis of
the route’s economy, measured based on trajectory zigzag-
ging (deflection from a straight line). This measure offers
a multi-resolution functionality: both the shape of the en-
tire route and the lengths of its fragments of various sizes
are examined. The intention is to eliminate, from the algo-
rithm, the many drawbacks referred to above. The approach
accepts various route variants between the origin and des-
tination locations and treats equally, as long as they exhibit
similar economy metrics. It is conceptually easy and un-
derstandable for the operator assessing the alarm, who may
easily assess the zigzagging of the route themselves. It is
ready to run out of the box, without a lengthy and com-
plicated learning phase, but some parameter tuning may
still be necessary. The algorithm is also lightweight, fa-
cilitating its application in large-scale systems. It utilizes
a para-stream character, and thus is suitable for on-line
monitoring applications. Stream processing is strictly a syn-
onym for “ideal data processing algorithm” [11]. Such an
algorithm is characterized by constant memory usage per
the size of input data. Thus, if the input data has the form
of a stream of data, i.e. a set of GNSS frames for a given
vehicle, memory usage does not reach a certain limit as the
stream proceeds.
2. The Algorithm
The algorithm described in this section is used for detecting
anomalies in the economy of the observed moving trajec-
tory. Normally, a vehicle should approach its destination
using a straight and short route. Whenever this require-
ment is not met, the route is treated as suspicious. There is
a possibility (risk) that deviation from the straight line was
caused by illegal activity.
The concept of the algorithm may be easily explained by
comparing it with geofencing. In geofencing, we define
corridors along the projected route; whenever the corridor
is left, an alarm is triggered. The most obvious drawback
of this approach is the fact that multiple potential routes
exist between the origin and the destination, as explained
in the example of the grid layout of roads, as depicted in
Fig. 1. Routes A, B, C look equally reasonable and the
number of similarly reasonable routes grows exponentially
along with the increase of the grid size. Therefore, it is
not obvious how a specific corridor should be defined. If
we define a “grid of corridors”, i.e. those existing along
all road segments present in the grid, we also accept such
routes as D, which is lengthy and winding, and thus clearly
suspicious in terms of potentially illegal loading and un-
loading operations.
Fig. 1. Some potential routes between two points in a grid of
roads. (See digital edition to find the color version).
Another drawback of corridors is that they do not allow
any small deviations to rest areas, parking lots, tire shops,
etc., especially if reaching these requires some maneuvers
on one way roads and clover leaf interchanges.
Thus, in the proposed system, geofencing is replaced by
an analysis of trajectory zigzagging. For given a trajec-
tory T with points x1, x2, . . ., xn on a plane, we define








where dist(x,y) denotes the Euclidean distance between
x and y. Alternatively, the length of the shortest path be-
tween x and y along the existing roads could be used for
dist if map information is available, as would be discussed
later. Zigzagging is simply the ratio between the length of
the trajectory and the distance between its end points. The
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main idea is to set a limit value (Zmax) for the permitted
zigzagging of vehicle trajectories. If trajectory zigzagging
exceeds Zmax, the trajectory becomes suspicious and illegal
activity is taken into consideration. The rationale behind
such a setting is that zigzagging routes suffer from bad
economy – if the driver does need to go to illegal locations,
they would not need to take such routes. Note, for exam-
ple, that routes A, B, C (if represented as sufficiently dense
discrete trajectories, i.e. trajectories with sufficiently large
numbers of points) are characterized by a zigzagging mea-
sure of approx. the square root of 2. Route D has a larger
zigzagging measure. This example shows that should Zmax
be set at say 2 or a little more, in order to allow routing in
a more complicated road grids.
Assessment of simple zigzagging measure values of the
entire trajectory between the origin and destination points
does not eliminate the potential of falsely evaluating the
correctness of a given route based on zigzagging. It needs
to be noted that if we take any fragment of the trajectory
into consideration, it also should be economical in itself, i.e.
should be characterized by a limited zigzagging measure.
To cope with this, a multiresolution analysis of the route
traveled so far, at a given point of the journey, should be
performed. The zigzagging measure of the entire trajectory
recorded so far, of a fragment of the trajectory ending at
the current location, or even of a smaller fragment of the
trajectory ending at the current location may be analyzed.
Let us assume that the vehicle’s route is given by the stream
of points x0, x1, x2, . . ., with x0 being its origin. The
proposed stream algorithm, invoked upon receiving frame
xi, is outlined as Algorithm 1 (variable therewasanalarm
is initialized to false).
Algorithm 1 . Response to a new trajectory point xi
1: If therewasanalarm Then
2: Return
3: End if















2, . . . ,x
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where r is the resolution level, n1, n2, . . . nr are not




5: Compute Z(T1), Z(T2), . . ., Z(Tr) (zigzagging for
empty or one-point degenerate trajectories is assumed
to be 0).
6: If any of them exceeds Zmax Then
7: Trigger alarm
8: therewasanalarm = true
9: End if
The proposed algorithm is also depicted in Figs. 2–3.
An alarm is generated only once for a given route in order
to avoid the operator’s distraction by a storm of alarms for
consecutive trajectory points. This feature uses the Boolean
therewasanalarm variable.
Note that since variables n1, n2, . . ., nr approximating sub-
trajectories at particular resolution levels are limited by N,
the number of resolution levels r is finite. Therefore, the
algorithm conforms to the stream regime. The price that
needs to be paid for this is that sub-trajectories may be
approximated at N points at the most. In practice, it is
difficult to implementing step 1 without storing all points
x0, x2, . . ., xi in the memory.
Fig. 2. Algorithm 1 used for processing a new trajectory point.
2.1. Selecting Route Approximations at Specified
Resolution Levels
At each resolution level, the zigzagging of approximations
T1,T2, . . . ,Tr of the sub-trajectory is examined. These ap-
proximations are some trajectories made up of selected
points of the sub-trajectory that has been observed so far.
The selection of points and the construction of Ti is based
on keeping memory usage limited.
Determination of Ti is based on characterization of the res-
olution, performed by the reference length step for a given
i. This reference length is called stridei. This is given by:
stridei = minstride2i for i = 1, . . . ,r .
The algorithm’s minstride parameter defines the length of
the reference segment of the trajectory at the finest resolu-
tion level. Parameter r itself is evaluated as:
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rrbu f len ·minstride
⌉
,
where rrbu f len = N−1 is the assumed maximum number
of segments in Ti, maxroutelength is the maximum possible
length (sum of segment lengths) of the entire trajectory.
The default parameter settings are: rrbu f len = 4, max-
routelength = 20,000 km, minstride = 2 km.
Fig. 3. Approximating the trajectory created so far with trajec-
tories at 3 different resolution levels (r = 3). Probably, only the
medium resolution trajectory t2 (yellow) has a zigzagging measure
that exceeds the alarm threshold.
Trajectories Tj for j = 1, . . . ,r are updated upon receiving
a current point xi of the trajectory according to Al-
gorithm 2. Here, T ′j is a cyclic buffer storing a se-
quence of rrbuflen latest elements appended to this
buffer. Ti′j is initialized to empty sequence. Variable y j is
initialized to x0.
Algorithm 2 . Update of trajectory approximation Tj with
a new trajectory point xi
1: stridei := pow(2i,minstride)
2: r := dlog2 maxroutelength/(rrbu f len ·minstride)e
3: If dist(xi,yi)≥ stridei Then
4: Append xi to Tj (with deleting all but rrbuflen last
element of the sequence stored in T ′j .
5: Set yi = xi.
6: End if
7: Return current Tj as sequence stored in T ′j (if it ends
with xi) or with appended point xi (otherwise).
In other words, sequence Tj is designed by choosing points
of sequence xi. The first is x0, any new point xi from the
vehicle’s trajectory is appended if and as soon as it is dis-
tanced from the previous appended point by at least stridei.
Such a sequence is appended the current point, if it does
not end with it. At most last rrbu f len appended points
are finally taken to form sequence Tj. Such an approach
ensures limited memory usage during the construction pro-
cess, which is O(rrbu f len). Moreover, sequence Tj has
segments of length of approximately strideii, except for
the last segment which was added to keep sequence Tj as
fresh as possible.
The settings for r and stridei (for i = 1, . . . ,r) are
selected so that:
• the logarithms of numbers stridei form an arith-
metic sequence,
• the coarsest resolution level, Tr is capable of cov-
ering the entire trajectory of the maximum length
maxroutelength, i.e. to contain its first and last point.
The Ti for other (i.e. those used to assess local zigzag-
ging of finer resolution levels), might obviously be
shorter.
2.2. Extensions
The algorithm is equipped with several extensions.
Different zigzagging limits may be used for Z(T1),
Z(T2), . . . ,Z(Tr), instead of a single Zmax, in order to al-
low greater zigzagging at fine resolution levels. For given
Ti, the limit is:
• Zmax,short if stridei < zigstridethreshold,
• Zmax,long otherwise.
The reason for this extension is an observation that nat-
ural zigzagging of vehicles differs depends on the scale.
In the case of routes that are less than 10 kilometers
long, roads are often projected as being perpendicular
to each other. Furthermore, drivers must perform ma-
neuvers that increase the zigzagging measure, like by-
passing one-way roads, making loops at multi-level in-
tersections, obeying “no-turn” signs, etc. Hence, the de-
fault parameter settings are Zmax,short = 2.0, Zmax,long = 1.7,
zigdistthershold =10 km.
The second extension allows to include the destination point
in the trajectory that has been covered so far. If we know
the trip’s destination (which is usually the case), we may
not only examine various zigzagging measures based on the
sub-trajectory covered so far, but we may also proactively
check whether various zigzags will need to become exces-
sive in the future, assuming that the vehicle will eventu-
ally reach its destination. This extension works as follows.
Upon receiving of consecutive point xi, Algorithms 1 and 2
are invoked, but:
• the zigzagging excess check is performed as in Al-
gorithm 1 (possibly with the extension of various
zigzagging limits),
• the zigzagging check is performed again, not for ap-
proximate trajectories T1, . . . ,Tr, but for these trajec-
tories, each with the destination point appended.
If any of these checks triggers an alarm, the entire algorithm
generates an alert. This extension allows to trigger alarms
in some situations. A typical situation is when a vehicle
starts its trip in the direction that is opposite to its destina-
tion, in order to perform some illegal activity. Then, in the
basic algorithm, any zigzagging activity observed increases
extensively only after the illegal location has been reached
and upon the vehicle starts moving towards the legal des-
tination. However, an operator observing the route might
be aware of the bad intentions of the driver even before the
illegal location is reached. The vehicle driving in the op-
posite direction it allowed to continue doing so. By adding
an artificial segment to the route covered so far, which pre-
dict the route ahead, allows the proposed algorithm to alert
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the operator before the illegal location is reached. This ad-
vantage is illustrated by one of the experiments presented
further on.
3. Discussion
Parameter minstride of the finest resolution naturally de-
termines the rank of distance corresponding to “nonsensi-
tivity level” of the algorithm to small deviations from the
route. Along short sections of the trajectory, comparable
with minstride, zigzagging may reach high values with-
out triggering an alarm. This allows the driver to safely
deviate to roadside facilities, such as hotels, restaurants or
service stations. This mechanism allows for some other ma-
neuvers as well: passing multi-level intersections, bypass-
ing local one-way roads, performing maneuvers required by
road signs. These trip disturbances may cause considerable
local trajectory zigzagging, even imply trajectory looping,
but as long as they are limited to a specific area of the
minstride rank, they will be accepted by the algorithm.
Memory usage. Memory usage of the presented algorithm





rrbu f len ·minstrade
)⌉
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The proposed algorithm assumes a limited length of the
route and rrbu f len and minstride are arbitrarily chosen
constants. While limiting the route length by constant
maxroutelength, constant memory usage is ensured. This
assumption is not very restrictive in practice and memory
usage increases only logarithmically with a potential in-
crease in maxroutelength.
Metrics used. In the algorithm, the length of shortest line
on the Earth surface between two points x, y is computed by
function dist(x,y). However, there is a possibility of using
map information instead, and of calculating the values of
dist(x,y) as the shortest road-based route between x and y.
Some additional care must be taken to account for poten-
tial noncommutativity of such a distance. This increases
the precision of the algorithm and boosts its independence
from specific road network configurations. Certainly, the
zigzagging limits would be decreased in such a scenario.
However, such a solution is complex to implement in large-
scale systems, i.e. for monitoring purposes. It requires ad-
ditional memory to cache the map data locally in order to
avoid extensive data traffic exchanges with the map server.
Moreover, cache memory should also offer a mechanism
for quickly calculating the distance between specific loca-
tions. Finding the shortest route online would clearly con-
sume too much resources. The mechanism should perhaps
contain some mesh of points with predefined distances and,
based on this data, should approximate the distance between
two given locations. This an interesting research problem
in itself.
Traveling salesman case. It is often the case that a vehicle
starting its trip has several destinations to visit. The algo-
rithm may still be applied to such a scenario, even when
the order of the visits is not known to the algorithm. The
trajectory covered so far needs to be simply reset to empty
and started anew upon any destination. This will allow
only the zigzagging along the route section between two
consecutive destination points to be examined. This frag-
ment should be economical, i.e. no excessive zigzagging
should be present. The extension expanding trajectories by
destination locations is slightly more difficult to adopt in
this case, since there are many destinations and we do not
know which is to be reached first. Therefore, at the receiv-
ing point xi, we should try all destinations and select the
scenario that is most favorable for the driver. If no attempts
trigger the alarm, the algorithm should keep quiet.
4. Numerical Demonstration
Several experiments with the proposed algorithm have been
conducted. Their aim was to simply validate the presented
approach, and to showcase the specific features and the
behavior of the algorithm in typical scenarios. The exten-
sion providing various zigzagging limits was on, while the
extension making use of the destination location was off
by default, and was only switched on in one experiment.
Default parameter settings were used.
A Java environment was used in the experiments. The code
was written to retain the algorithm’s efficiency, i.e. cyclic
buffers were used to collect the selected past points of the
trajectory.
The routes were generated in using the Google MyMaps
service as optimal routes form the town of Skierniewice
to Warsaw (Poland). To obtain uneconomical variants of
the route, specific mid-points were added to Google’s route
finder. These points served as illegal locations, while the al-
gorithm was still simply aware of Warsaw as the vehicle’s
destination. The algorithm observed the trajectory online
and triggered alarms, detecting suspected fraud. It needs
to be remained that the algorithm is designed to alert once
for each route to avoid a storm of alarms for consecutive
trajectory points. The point of the trajectory at which the
alarm occurred was registered and included in the subse-
quent presentation of the results.
The following experiments have been performed:
• the route from Skierniewice to Warsaw without any
mid-points. It was expected that this route would not
be assessed as suspicious;
• the route from Skierniewice to Warsaw with an
additional mid-point in a forest in the village of
Krakowiany, near the main road. This route includes
an apparent deviation using a road leading to the for-
est and should trigger an alarm. The forest, however,
is located near the main road (relatively to the length
of the entire route). Thus, zigzagging measure along
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Fig. 4. Route from Skierniewice to Warsaw without a deviation – no alarm triggered.
Fig. 5. Route from Skierniewice to Warsaw with a deviation to a forest in Krakowiany. An alarm has been triggered on the local road
leading to Krakowiany, after visiting the village (during the return from the forest).
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Fig. 6. Route from Skierniewice to Warsaw with a deviation to Łódź. The alarm has been triggered after visiting Łódź, on the return
leg of the journey.
Fig. 7. Route from Skierniewice to Warsaw with a deviation to Łódź. The algorithm uses route augmentation, making use of the
knowledge of the destination. The alarm was triggered before reaching Łódź.
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the entire route could not be excessive. The example
checks whether the algorithm reacts to an increase in
zigzagging observed locally;
• the route from Skierniewice to Warsaw, with a mid-
point of Łódź. When going to Łódź, a driver leav-
ing Skierniewice needs to go in the opposite direc-
tion than when heading to Warsaw. Therefore, such
a route should trigger an alarm;
• the route from Skierniewice to Warsaw, with a mid-
point of Łódź and, unlike in the case of other exper-
iments, the knowledge of the destination has been
used in this test. This means that the algorithm
augmented the trajectory covered so far with a seg-
ment between the current location and the destina-
tion. This augmentation should result in the alarm
being triggered even earlier than in a scenario without
augmentation.
The routes are presented in Figs. 4–7. The results of the ex-
periments are presented in the form of icons in pink circles
positioned at the locations where an alarm was detected.
Since the roads on which the alerts were triggered are of
the two-way variety, it is difficult to see, in the pictures,
which direction the vehicle was driving in while causing
the alarm. This is stated in the captions.
The alarms were triggered in concordance with our ex-
pectations. They appeared precisely along the routes with
mid-points that emulated illegal load or drop locations. The
route with the deviation to a forest shows the algorithm’s
ability to consider local route zigzagging. As far as the de-
viation to Łódź is concerned, the advantage of augmenting
the route with a segment between the current location and
the destination was shown. Without the augmentation, the
alarm is triggered after visiting the town. With the augmen-
tation, the alarm is generated earlier, on the way towards
Łódź. This is beneficial, since the algorithm with aug-
mentation is capable of making the same observations as
a human being. The vehicle is supposed to head for War-
saw, but drives in the opposite direction instead. Also, the
alarm is raised, in such a scenario, before the illegal ac-
tivity takes place, which allows the proactive actions to be
taken by the operator.
5. Conclusions
The proposed stream algorithm is capable of detecting truck
fraud. In contrast to its numerous counterparts, the pro-
posed solution uses an adequate and human-understood
route economy measure. It is lightweight and does not re-
quire a learning phase. In experimental trials it turned out
to behave reasonably and predictably.
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